A non-standard approach to a market with boundedly rational consumers and strategic firms. Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales

In our model, individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules based on imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research, social learning, and related fields. Demand can be viewed as the outcome of a population game whose revision protocol is determined by the consumers' behavioral rules. The consumer dynamics are then analyzed in order to explore the demand side and first implications for a strategic supply side.

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Year of publication:	2008-05
Authors:	Matzke, Christina ; Wirth, Benedikt
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	bounded rationality \| social learning \| population game \| mean dynamic

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	2 pages long
Classification:	C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968348