Noncompetitive Recycling and Market Power

We consider the steady-state equilibrium of an industry characterized by simultaneous decision-making between a produder of a primary good devides on the quality of the virgin product he will produce, and the producer of a perfectly substitutable, but more costly, recycled product, who decides on the fraction of the primary production he will recycle.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	GAUDET, Gérard ; VAN LONG, Ngo
Institutions:	Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal

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Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	24 pages
Classification:	L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L23 - Organization of Production
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005133120