Nonprice Rationing and Monopoly Price Structures when Demand is Stochastic
When demand is stochastic, a monopoly offering several product varieties, each at a preannounced price, can profitably discriminate in price if nonprice rationing mechanisms, such as queuing or reservations, can determine the order in which consumers are served. But in such circumstances the optimal price structure and, in turn, profit, depend on the particular ordering of consumers; the monopolist will prefer a rationing mechanism that gives priority to consumers with the lowest willingness to pay, because it allows profitable discrimination.
Year of publication: |
1982
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sherman, Roger ; Visscher, Michael |
Published in: |
Bell Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0361-915X. - Vol. 13.1982, 1, p. 254-262
|
Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Nonprice rationing and monopoly price structures when demand is stochastic
Sherman, Roger, (1982)
-
Persistent multiple prices for oscillating demand
Sherman, Roger, (1979)
-
Public utility price and capacity in the case of oscillating demand
Sherman, Roger, (1977)
- More ...