Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties

To be effective, norm enforcement often requires the participation of unaffected third parties. The logic of third-party intervention has, however, proven elusive because the costs always seem to outweigh the benefits. Using an evolutionary game theoretic approach, we posit that the intervention of unaffected bystanders is a triggered normative response and show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria subject to selection drift.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Carpenter, Jeffrey P. ; Matthews, Peter Hans
Published in:	Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). - ISSN 0932-4569. - Vol. 166.2010, 2, p. 239-258

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D3 - Distribution ; D64 - Altruism ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010625783