Note on a Two-Player All-pay Auction with Asymmetrical Bidders and Incomplete Information

The present paper analyzes a general class of first-price all-pay auctions where two players have different "bidding technologies" and one bidder has a head start advantage over his/her opponent. Equilibria are characterized for the complete information setting and for the case where there is incomplete asymmetrical information. In particular, the handicapped player is uncertain about the size of the opponent’s advantage.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Magnani, M.
Institutions:	Facoltà di Economia, Università degli Studi di Parma
Keywords:	All-pay auctions and Auction theory and Games with asymmetrical players and Incomplete information games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Department Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy), Economics Department Working Papers Number 2010-EP06 3 pages long
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008765890