Note on Risk Aversion and Sharing of Firm-Specific Information in Duopolies.
This note extends earlier work on the effects of risk aversion on the preferences of duopolists to share information. It is shown that the common finding that Cournot duopolists prefer to share firm-specific information no longer obtains for some parameterizations. In particular, the greater the aversion to risk, the larger the parameter regions in which not sharing information is preferred. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Kao, Jennifer L ; Hughes, John S |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 41.1993, 1, p. 103-12
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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