Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige
Year of publication: |
2006-02
|
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Authors: | O'Neill, Barry |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | prestige | nuclear weapons | common knowledge | signaling | countersignaling | global games | symbolism |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The price is None Number 1560 43 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H56 - National Security and War |
Source: |
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Hendel, Ulrich, (2012)
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Too cool for school? : signaling and countersignaling
Feltovich, Nick, (1999)
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Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement
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