Observability increases the demand for commitment devices

Christine L. Exley (Harvard Business School), Jeffrey K. Naecker (Wesleyan University)

Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one's future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time-inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates

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Year of publication:	March 4, 2016
Authors:	Exley, Christine L. ; Naecker, Jeffrey
Publisher:	[Boston, MA] : Harvard Business School
Subject:	Soziales Verhalten \| Social behaviour \| Selbstverpflichtung \| Voluntary agreement

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 17 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Working papers / Harvard Business School, Division of Research. - Boston, Mass. : Harvard Business School, ISSN 0898-7629, ZDB-ID 2276801-4. - Vol. 16, 064 Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper ; No. 16-064
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2498145 [DOI]
Classification:	C93 - Field Experiments ; D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011551073