Odious debt : law-and-economics perspectives

Stephania Bonilla. With a foreword by Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernd Schäfer

The international debate on odious debt touches on many fundamental issues, including the intersection between ethics and finance, the moral responsibility of parties to international contracts and of sovereigns to their constituents. Stephania Bonilla analyzes the dynamics of sovereign debt relations and looks at how the incentive structures of the parties involved can have implications on odious debt. She specifically looks at the role of international law in the reputation mechanism sustaining creditor-debtor relations. Further, she examines the factors and players that drive change in sovereign debt governance, in an effort to move towards a more sustainable financial system with a more equitable distribution of burden between lenders and borrowers

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Year of publication:	[2011] ; 1st edition
Authors:	Bonilla, Stephania
Other Persons:	Schäfer, Hans-Bernd (preface)
Publisher:	Wiesbaden : Gabler Verlag / Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, Wiesbaden
Subject:	Öffentliche Schulden \| Public debt \| Gläubiger \| Creditors \| Internationales Recht \| International law \| Internationaler Kreditmarkt \| Staatensukzession \| Rückzahlung \| Zahlungsanspruch
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [d-nb.info] ; Description [swbplus.bsz-bw.de]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (XII, 164 Seiten) 2 Diagramme
Series:	SpringerLink / Bücher Gabler research Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Thesis:	Dissertation, Universität Hamburg, 2010
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references Foreword; Acknowledgements; Table of contents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 The traditional doctrine of odious debt; 1.1.1 War debts; 1.1.2 Subjugation debts; 1.1.3 Regime debts; 1.1.4 A note on the doctrine; 1.2 The literature; 1.2.1 Legal proposals; 1.2.2 Other proposals; 1.3 Approach and outline of this book; 2 Reputation and Odious Debt; 2.1 The Legal Approach; 2.1.1 Legal Rationales to Succession of Obligations; 2.1.2 Lack of Explanatory Power; 2.2 The Economic Approach; 2.2.1 Why Does Sovereign Debt Exist?; 2.3 The Comeback of Reputation; 2.3.1 Incomplete Information and Changing Preferences 2.3.2 Repayment Record and Diminishing Returns2.3.3 Context; 2.4 Implications for Odious Debt; 2.4.1 Repayment Record; 2.4.2 Context; 2.4.3 Default and odious debt; 2.4.4 Repayment and odious debt; 2.5 Insights from the Economic Analysis of International Law; 2.5.1 The Role of Law in the International Context; 2.5.2 How law Implicates Reputation; 2.5.3 Interpreting the Law: The Odious Debt Doctrine is Dead; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 A Focus on Creditors and Odious Debt; 3.1 Particularities of Sovereign Debt; 3.1.1 Principal-Agent Problem; 3.1.2 Succession of Obligations 3.1.3 Limited Scope of Judicial Remedies3.1.4 Lack of Bankruptcy Regime; 3.2 Different Creditors, Different Incentives; 3.2.1 Private Creditors - Bondholders; 3.2.2 Private Creditors Banks; 3.2.3 Official Creditors: States; 3.3 5 Factors Affecting the Dynamics of Sovereign Debt; 3.3.1 Outside Influences; 3.3.2 Number of Different Transactions with Debtor Country; 3.3.3 Form and Substance; 3.3.4 Information; 3.3.5 Sovereign Debt Restructuring; 3.4 Reputation and Odious Debt; 3.4.1 Private Creditors: Bonds; 3.4.2 Private Creditors: Banks; 3.4.3 Official Creditors; 3.5 Conclusion 4 An International Solution to Odious Debt: An Ex Ante Ex Post Analysis4.1 Applying Shavell's Analysis to the Odious Debt Context; 4.2 Examination of Shavell's 4 Determinants; 4.2.1 Difference in Knowledge about Risky Activities; 4.2.2 Incapability of paying for full magnitude of harm done; 4.2.3 Parties would not face the threat of suit for harm done; 4.2.4 Administrative costs; 4.3 General Advantages and Disadvantages of Ex Ante v Ex Post Approach toOdious Debt; 4.4 Loan sanctions from an ex ante v. ex post perspective; 4.4.1 Trade off between Information and Deterrence 4.4.2 Definitional Issues4.4.3 Ex Ante Certainty; 4.4.4 Expectations from Ex Post Designation; 4.4.5 Risk of Bias; 4.4.6 Action while Despot is Still in Power; 4.4.7 Failure to Deal with Odious Debt already Created; 4.4.8 Costs associated with the UNSC; 4.4.9 Risk of Collision by "Rogue" States and Globalisation; 4.5 Summary of trade offs and conclusion; 5 Odious Debt: Driving Change in Sovereign Debt Governance; 5.1 International Economic Governance: Odious Debt; 5.1.1 The Official Sector; 5.1.2 NGOs and Odious Debt; 5.1.3 The Epistemic/academic community 5.2 A Comment on the Triple Helix and Odious Debt
ISBN:	978-3-8349-6763-3 ; 978-3-8349-2993-8
Other identifiers:	10.1007/978-3-8349-6763-3 [DOI]
Classification:	Geld, Inflation, Kapitalmarkt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013522919