On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
In this paper we prove that the plurality rule and the run-off procedure are asymptotically strategy-proof for any number of alternatives and that the proportion of profiles, at which a successful attempt to manipulate might take place, is in both cases bounded from above by <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$K/\sqrt n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, where n is the number of participating agents and K does not depend on n. We also prove that for the plurality rule the proportion of manipulable profiles is asymptotically bounded from below by <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$K/\sqrt n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, where k also does not depend on n. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Slinko, Arkadii |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 2, p. 313-324
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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