On Auctions within a Ring of Collusive Bidders
Rings of collusive bidders at an English auction frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of knockouts. This paper presents a model of sequences of knockouts. I investigate the relationship between the distributive outcome of each sequence and each solution of bidding ring games. I show that each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core. In particular, a sequence of knockouts with the finest nested rings yields the Shapley value. Also, a sequence of knockouts at each of which a ring can guarantee its advantage for itself yields the nucleolus.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Oishi, Takayuki |
Institutions: | Faculty of Economics, Keio University |
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