On bargaining sets for finite economies

We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result, this Edgeworth bargaining set shrinks to the set of Walrasian allocations.

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Year of publication:	2014-07-18
Authors:	Hervés-Estévez, Javier ; Moreno-García, Emma
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Bargaining sets \| coalitions \| core \| veto mechanism

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D00 - Microeconomics. General ; D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183541