ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES

The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set coincides with the core' is not a prosperity property.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	MEERTENS, MARC ; POTTERS, J. A. M. ; REIJNIERSE, J. H.
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 09.2007, 02, p. 199-213
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Symmetric games \| bargaining \| core

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081050