On Bayesian Implementable Allocations.
This paper identifies several social-choice correspondences which are or are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. The authors show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information, neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social-choice correspondences. The authors also identify conditions under which the Rational Expectations Equilibrium correspondence is implementable. The authors extend the concepts of fair allocations and Lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information, and show that envy-free allocation and Lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1987
|
---|---|
Authors: | Palfrey, Thomas R ; Srivastava, Sanjay |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 54.1987, 2, p. 193-208
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies.
Palfrey, Thomas R, (1991)
-
Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies.
Palfrey, Thomas R, (1989)
-
Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem.
Palfrey, Thomas R, (1989)
- More ...