On Competition for Listings

We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or the bottom.

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Authors:	Beladi, Hamid ; Tay, Nicholas S. P. ; Oladi, Reza
Institutions:	College of Business, University of Texas-San Antonio
Subject:	Information intermediary \| reputation capital \| listing requirements

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The price is Free Number 0003 11 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; G1 - General Financial Markets ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005553356