On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law and Economics

Sloof et al.'s [2006] elegant study of default breach remedies illustrates both the potential and limitations of experimental law and economics (ELE). Potentially, the rigorous methodology of experimental economics can provide fully controlled tests of relationships among legally significant variables. Human behavior is context-dependent, however. The validity of ELE would therefore be limited if it were, for example, to disregard legal institutions and context in an automatic adherence to all conventions of experimental economics

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Tor, Avishalom
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Experiment \| Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Insolvenz \| Insolvency \| Vertragsrecht \| Contract law \| Vertrag \| Contract

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (5 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 163
Classification:	C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; K00 - Law and Economics. General ; K12 - Contract Law
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053730