On Efficiency, Tie Breaking Rules and Role Assignment Procedures in Evolutionary Bargaining
Year of publication: |
2003-11-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Poulsen, Anders |
Institutions: | Nationalökonomisk Institut, Institut for Økonomi |
Subject: | Game theory Bargaining | Two-stage Nash Demand Game | Efficiency | Evolutionary stability | Tie-breaking role assignment | Truly asymmetric contest |
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