On Equilibria in Duopolies with Finite Strategy Spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Talluri, Kalyan
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 2004 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.562945 [DOI]
Classification:	C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070814