On Essential Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games

A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature. An economic game illustrates our results.

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Year of publication:	2012-12-30
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick
Subject:	infinite normal-form game \| equilibrium refinement \| essential equilibrium \| equilibrium existence \| B-security

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Series:	Departmental Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	20 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607666