On Evolution, Subgame Perfection and Retaliation

Two approaches to equilibrium selection are contrasted in the context of an investment-opportunism-retaliation (IOR) game. In this game, a valuable (efficient) investment may be forgone in the face of opportunistic behavior, however, players who are victims of opportunism may retaliate to the detriment of both players. In this environment, we compare sub-game perfection with the notion of evolutionary stability.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Eaton, B-C ; Morrison, W-G
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
Subject:	GAMES \| PRODUCTION

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005767726