On f-Core Equivalence with General Widespread Externalities
Second version: November, 1995. <p>This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders [7] for continuum economies with widespread externalities --- i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control. Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free disposal of divisible goods nor monotone preferences are assumed. Instead, a slightly strengthened form of local non-satiation suffices. However, in general it is proved only that any f-core allocation is a weak Nash--Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, the proof uses an elementary argument which does not rely on Lyapunov's theorem or convexity of the integral of a correspondence w.r.t. a non-atomic measure.
Authors: | Hammond, Peter J. |
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Institutions: | Department of Economics, Stanford University |
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