On Gale and Shapley ‘College admissions and stability of marriage’

In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavily destabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by the arrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly how stability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomena affecting the composition of the marriage market.

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Year of publication:	2008-12-01
Authors:	GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. ; Filomena, GARCIA ; Joana, PAIS ; Joana, RESENDE
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	Matching \| stability \| marriage model \| divorce cascades

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Sciences Economiques Number 2008046 1 pages long
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D00 - Microeconomics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984697