On liability insurance for automobiles

Sjur Didrik Flåm; Elmar Wolfstetter

Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other motorists. In most countries such liability must be insured by law. That law may favor expensive or heavy vehicles, prone to suffer or inflict large losses. This paper explores links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It presumes cooperative insurance, but non-cooperative acquisition of vehicles. Thus, the Nash equilibrium and its degree of efficiency depend on the liability regime.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Flåm, Sjur D. ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	Mannheim [u. a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	liability \| mutual insurance \| core \| pure Nash equilibrium \| anonymous games \| non-atomic measure \| Kfz-Versicherung \| Automobile insurance \| Kraftfahrzeug \| Motor vehicle \| Entscheidung \| Decision \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (16 S.)
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 321
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/93979 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965107