On Optimal Enclosure and Optimal Timing of Enclosure.
This paper demonstrates that the enforcement of property rights by enclosing properties under common access is, in general, socially suboptimal: the timing of enclosure may be inappropriate, causing inefficiency. It is argued that the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics applies for a given collection of production sets, while enclosure implies a choice over collections of production sets. Copyright 1994 by The Economic Society of Australia.
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Long, Ngo Van |
Published in: |
The Economic Record. - Economic Society of Australia - ESA, ISSN 1475-4932. - Vol. 70.1994, 211, p. 368-72
|
Publisher: |
Economic Society of Australia - ESA |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Real investment decisions under information constraints
Gaudet, GĂ©rard, (1995)
-
In memoriam : Ngo Van Long (1948-2022)
Turnovsky, Stephen J., (2022)
-
Innovation and the transfer of technology : a leader-follower model
Chiarella, Carl, (1988)
- More ...