On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Thirumulanathan, D. ; Sundaresan, Rajesh ; Narahari, Y. |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 82.2019, p. 31-60
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Subject: | Convex optimization | Economics | Game theory | Optimal auctions | Stochastic orders | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming |
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