On partially honest nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains : a sufficient condition
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Doghmi, Ahmed ; Ziad, Abderrahmane |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 13.2013, 1, p. 415-428
|
Subject: | Nash implementation | partial honesty | single-peaked preferences | single-plateaued preferences | single-dipped preferences | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
Extent: | graph. Darst. |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader |
Other identifiers: | 10.1515/bejte-2012-0028 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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