On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills.

In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public good like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Vagstad, S.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	PRODUCTIVITY \| FAMILY \| HOUSEHOLD \| SEX

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	12 pages
Classification:	D13 - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation ; H41 - Public Goods ; J16 - Economics of Gender ; J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647122