ON PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS OF COMPLEMENTARY GOODS

We compare sequential and bundle auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively affects future market opportunities and competition varies across projects. We find that - if allocation of the projects has to be ensured - bundle auctions with subsequent resale opportunities yield a lower and less risky overall price, whereas sequential procurement leads to the efficient outcome.

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Year of publication:	2004-01
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika
Institutions:	Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE)
Subject:	Sequential auctions \| bundling \| stochastic scale effects \| procurement

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers. Serie AD.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published by Ivie 36 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; H57 - Procurement ; D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731408