On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets

A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Kind, Hans Jarle ; Koethenbuerger, Marko ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 104.2009, 2, p. 86-88
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Ad valorem taxes Unit taxes Two-sided markets Revenue-dominance Welfare-dominance Monopoly

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023519