On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Albano, Gian-Luigi ; Germano, Fabrizio ; Lovo, Stefano
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Signalling \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Auktion \| Auction \| EU-Staaten \| EU countries \| Mobilkommunikation \| Mobile communications

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (21 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2003 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.286559 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034692