On some k-scoring rules for committee elections : agreement and Condorcet principle
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Diss, Mostapha ; Kamwa, Eric ; Tlidi, Abdelmonaim |
Published in: |
Revue d'économie politique. - Paris : Dalloz, ISSN 0373-2630, ZDB-ID 241473-9. - Vol. 130.2020, 5, p. 699-725
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Subject: | Voting | Committee | Borda | Condorcet | Scoring rules | Chamberlin-Courant | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting |
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