On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Houba, Harold ; Wen, Quan |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 37.2008, 3, p. 509-519
|
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes | Collective bargaining theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Theorie | Theory |
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