On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems
A social welfare function is Arrovian if it is transitive-valued and satisfies IIA. We examine the logical relation between the statements (A) If f is Arrovian with domain F then it is dictatorial if it satisfies the Pareto criterion and (W) If f is Arrovian with domain F then it is dictatorial or inversely dictatorial if it is non-null and satisfies non-imposition. We exhibit a class of domains on which W implies A and another on which A implies W. We also present examples of domains on which one of the statements is true and the other is false. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S. |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 20.2003, 2, p. 273-281
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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