On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Mailath, George J. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 44.1988, 2, p. 413-424
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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