On the coincidence of the core and the bargaining sets

We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we sufficiently raise the worth of the grand coalition (the efficiency level). This coincidence result does not hold for other well-known bargaining sets like the Mas-Colell bargaining set and its variants.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Izquierdo, Josep M ; Rafels, Carles
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 3, p. 2035-2043
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	cooperative games \| bargaining sets \| core

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278755