On the collusive nature of managerial contracts based on comparative performance
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca |
Published in: |
Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 74.2020, 1, p. 12-18
|
Subject: | Collusion | Price competition | Quantity competition | Strategic delegation | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Preiswettbewerb | Wettbewerb | Competition | Duopol | Duopoly | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Führungskräfte | Managers | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kartell | Cartel | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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