On the Desirability of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union

The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem

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Year of publication:	[2008]
Authors:	Chari, Varadarajan V.
Other Persons:	Kehoe, Patrick J. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2008]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Finanzpolitik \| Fiscal policy \| Währungsunion \| Monetary union \| Öffentliche Schulden \| Public debt \| Trittbrettfahrerverhalten \| Free rider problem
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 1, 2003 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	E4 - Money and Interest Rates ; E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System ; E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; F3 - International Finance ; F31 - Foreign Exchange ; F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770791