On the desirability of fiscal constraints in a monetary union

V. V. Chari; Patrick J. Kehoe

"The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site

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Year of publication:	2003
Other Persons:	Chari, V. V. (contributor) ; Kehoe, Patrick J. (contributor)
Publisher:	Minneapolis : Federal Reserve Bank, Research Dep.
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Finanzpolitik \| Fiscal policy \| Währungsunion \| Monetary union \| Öffentliche Schulden \| Public debt \| Trittbrettfahrerverhalten \| Free rider problem

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Extent:	Online Ressource, 147 KB, text
Series:	Staff report. - Minneapolis, Minn. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2624366-0. - Vol. 330
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Record-last-verified: 16-02-04
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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