On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
Xiang Han
| Year of publication: |
2024
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| Authors: | Han, Xiang |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory : JET. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ZDB-ID 1469177-2. - Vol. 218.2024, Art.-No. 105842, p. 1-23
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| Subject: | Indivisible object | Weak priority | Random allocation | Deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking | Ex-post constrained efficiency | School choice | Schulauswahl | Allokation | Allocation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105842 [DOI] |
| Classification: | d47 ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015070826