On the Emergence of Social Norms

We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We details the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.

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Year of publication:	2007-01
Authors:	Cartwright, Edward
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of Kent
Subject:	Social norms \| conformity \| best reply

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Studies in Economics. - ISSN 1466-0814.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763210