On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion
In a model of strategic interaction between firms in lobbying activity, I show that capitalists might prefer tariffs (protection) to production subsidies (promotion). This is due to the congestion problem arising from the government's convex welfare costs of providing subsidies as opposed to both the free-rider problem and the congestion problem acting in opposite directions in the case of tariffs. If an industry association exists, coordination can be achieved when lobbying for tariffs, but not in the case of production subsidies. Copyright 2000 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mitra, D. |
Published in: |
Economics and Politics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 12.2000, 1, p. 33-51
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
International trade and employment : Theory and evidence from Korean firms
Jha, Priyaranjan, (2021)
-
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, (2019)
-
Terrorism and international air travel : A gravity approach
Mitra, Devashish, (2018)
- More ...