On the Equivalence of Information Design by Uninformed and Informed Principals
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zapechelnyuk, Andy |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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