On the evolutionary edge of altruism: A game-theoretic proof of Hamilton's rule for a simple case of siblings
We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton's rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game between siblings.
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Stark, Oded ; Wang, You Qiang |
Publisher: |
Vienna : Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) |
Subject: | Altruismus | Gefangenendilemma | Theorie | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | evolution of altruism | Hamilton's rule | one-shot prisoner's dilemma game |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 741110458 [GVK] hdl:10419/71251 [Handle] RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:139 [RePEc] |
Classification: | A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D64 - Altruism |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292788