On the existence of an equilibrium in the Split-the-Difference Mechanism over an uncountable set with a singular part

Broman (89) analyzes the mixed Nash equilibria of the split-the-difference mechanism over countable sets. She leaves as an open question whether there may be mixed equilibria over uncountable sets with singular parts. In this note, I propose such an equilibrium the support of the strategies is the union of a countable set and an interval.

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Year of publication:	2007-06-20
Authors:	Bertomeu, Jeremy
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2007, 26, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Keywords:	Double Auction Bargaining Mixed Equilibrium Complete Information Singular

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D0 - Microeconomics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629557