On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Balder, Erik J. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 68.1996, 1, p. 133-148
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Subject: | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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