On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria

It is argued that if an out-of-equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to justify, in some extensive form game, the non-existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Quesada, Antonio
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2001, 5, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Extensive form game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094658