On the existence of share contracts under limited liability

In a principal-agent relationship under limited liability, the agent in general receives the full share of revenue. We show that when the agent exerts effort in multiple tasks, the effort substitution effect helps explain the existence of share contracts even under limited liability.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Dam, Kaniṣka ; Ruiz Pérez, Daniel
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 3, p. 552-555
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Multitasking \| Effort substitution \| Share contracts

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041789