On the feasibility of power and status ranking in traditional setups
This paper aims at a better understanding of the conditions under which unequal rank or power positions may get permanently established through asymmetric gift exchange when a gift brings pride to the donor and shame to the recipient. Such a framework matches numerous observations reported in the sociological and anthropological literature dealing with patronage relations in traditional setups. A central result derived from our model is that an asymmetric gift exchange equilibrium can occur only if the importance attached to social shame by a recipient is smaller than that attached to social esteem by a donor. Moreover, if this (necessary) condition is fulfilled, an asymmetric gift exchange will take place only if the recipient's productivity is neither too high nor too low. Finally, the possibility of a parasitic response of the gift recipient is more likely to be observed when the donee's sensitivity to social shame is low, or when his productivity is high.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Platteau, Jean-Philippe ; Sekeris, Petros G. |
Published in: |
Journal of Comparative Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0147-5967. - Vol. 38.2010, 3, p. 267-282
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Social esteem Status Power Patronage Gift exchange |
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