On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests.
An important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests. The Chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently. The Virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient 'sneaky' methods of redistribution. This paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests. It shows that, when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predisposition of politicians, inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Coate, Stephen ; Morris, Stephen |
Published in: |
Journal of Political Economy. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 103.1995, 6, p. 1210-35
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
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