On the impossibility of fair risk allocation
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Csóka, Péter ; Pintér, Miklós |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 16.2016, 1, p. 143-158
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Subject: | coherent measures of risk | risk allocation games | totally balanced games | exact games | shapley value | core | Risiko | Risk | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Messung | Measurement | Shapley-Wert | Shapley value | Core | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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